For more than twenty five years, Fine has been challenging the traditional interpretation of the violations of Bell inequalities (BI) by experiment. A natural interpretation of Fine's theorem is that it provides us with an alternative set of assumptions on which to put the blame for the failure of the BI, and a new interpretation of the violation of the BI by experiment should follow. This is not, however, how Fine interprets his theorem. Indeed, Fine claims that his result undermines other interpretations, including the traditional interpretation in terms of local realism. The aim of this paper is to understand and to assess Fine's claims. We distinguish three different strategies that Fine uses in order to support his interpretation of his result.
completely determined at a time t + δt, given its state at t. 9 Accordingly, a deterministic h.v. model is such that the outcomes of a given measurement are completely determined by the state of the system before measurement, possibly together with the measurement context. By contrast, a stochastic mode includes a stochastic dynamics at the "hidden" level, such that the complete state of both the system and the experimental context does not determine completely the result of the measurement. H.v. models can be stochastic.
We can now introduce the weakest interpretation of the notion of realism Let us turn to the second aspect of Local Realism, i.e. locality. The notion of locality within Bell-type theorems and Bell-type experiments have been a central matter of controversy. Most commonly, locality is characterized in a deliberately vague way in terms of the prohibition of "influences" between spatially separated regions. 10 The condition is traditionally supposed to be 9 For a detailed study of the notion of determinism in the context of Bell experiments, in particular for a distinction between two-time determinism and dynamical determinism, see [16] . 10 Clearly, the notion of influence is vague, in particular when one wants to draw consequences concerning the relationships between the notion of locality in the Bell context and in Relativity Theory. This problem cannot be addressed in any details here for it would take us off course. For an extended study on this topic, see [36] .
Fine's theorem and its possible interpretations
Fine proved the following theorem:
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Theorem 1
The following conditions on the correlations of a Bell-type experiment with i, j ∈ {1, 2} are equivalent:
(1) The BI hold for the probability distributions of the experiment;
(2) There is a deterministic hidden variable model of the experiment returning the observed outcome distributions (singles and doubles); The result is multifold but two striking features deserve discussion. First, Fine's theorem provides us with alternative derivations of the BI: he shows that it is sufficient, for a probabilistic model to satisfy the BI, to have well defined joint probability distributions for all pairs and triples of observables, or to have well defined joint distributions for all four observables, whether these observables are compatible or not -let us call these PJPD, for Prob- 14 The original proof is to be found in [21] ; [22] is more philosophically concerned, and more ambitious in terms of the consequences Fine wants to draw from his result, and [25] is making the point in a non-technical way.
lematic Joint Probability Distributions. (We say"Problematic" because they cannot be correct because of the violation of the BI by experiment). Second, Fine's theorem establishes the converse of the original Bell derivation of the inequalities.
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A natural interpretation of Fine's result is as follows. An alternative derivation of the BI is provided: the BI hold in any probabilistic model in which the PJPD are well defined. Alternative assumptions are uncovered on which we can put the blame in a Bell-type modus tollens argument. No model in which the PJPD are well defined can give an account of all quantum phenomena. The ontological significance of this fact can be the subject of philosophical inquiry.
This is not the way in which Fine interprets his theorem. From 1982 on, he
has been holding that his theorem does more than provide an alternative derivation from which additional interpretations of the ontological situation underlying Bell-type experiments can be made. Rather, Fine contends that the interpretation in terms of well defined joint probability distributions su- 15 That is to say, Fine shows that any model satisfying the BI is equivalent to a deterministic h.v. model of the experiment. It should be noted that Fine's theorem also contains results about factorizable, and hence potentially stochastic, models. It
shows that any factorizable model of the experiment is equivalent to a deterministic one. In fact, this is a slightly weaker result than the one Suppes and Zanotti obtained in [44] , that any factorizable model of the experiment (in which one can have perfect anticorrelations) is in fact deterministic (see also [52] and [16, p.61-62] 
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In this section, we shall first explain how ensemble representations indeed include the definition of the PJPD. We shall then proceed to criticize Fine's strong conclusion in pointing out that a large class of hidden variable theories do not construe quantum observables as random variables over a common classical probability space. For this class of h.v. theories, Fine's argument does not stand.
Ensemble representations and joint probabilities
To construct an ensemble representation is a way to reduce statistical distributions of outcomes to determinate but unknown states. In our case, let the "complete state" of a system be the quantum state plus the set of hidden variables λ which together determine the results of measurements. Consider now the set Λ of all possible hidden variables λ. Even if all we know about a system is confined to the probability distribution over a spectrum of possible 20 [24, p.45] outcomes given by |ψ , we want the system under consideration to be really in one of the complete states corresponding to some variables λ (or the state |ψ really describes an ensemble of systems, each of which is in one of the complete states corresponding to the λ). For each |ψ , this set Λ is then structured as a classical probability space, that is to say, is equipped with a probability measure on its Borel sets B Λ . Thus, for a given |ψ , there is a probability density ρ |ψ (λ) of the possible hidden parameters λ over the space Λ. That is to say,
represents the probability that the hidden variables lie in the interval I =
What remains to be done is to provide a formal way of connecting the statistical distributions of outcomes with this probability measure. To this aim, 
So, the probability structure on the set of hidden variables is projected on the space of the possible values of each observable. Thus, the statistical distributions of outcomes given by |ψ for a given observable are reduced to statistical distributions of hidden variables.
Further, since the functions [Q i ] are defined as random variables on a common
is in turn a random variable on the Cartesian product Λ n , and there is a new probability measure defined on the Borel sets of its range, fully characterized by ρ |ψ (λ) on B Λ .
In particular, for all pairs of observables (Q 1 , Q 2 ), whether compatible or not according to quantum formalism, the joint probability
is defined for all Borel function f such that they satisfy, for F 1 ,F 2 , Borel subsets of respectively B E 1 and B E 2 .
In other words, the probability that two observables take jointly some given values is fully determined by considering the intersection of the sets of hidden variables respectively corresponding to the given values. 
To summarize, such h.v. models amount to constructing an ensemble representation for all the observables, which includes the definition of joint probabilities for all observables returning the singles as marginals, whether these observables are commuting or not. By Fine's theorem, the Bell inequalities hold for any probabilistic model of this kind.
Granted then, it is the case that any probabilistic model in which the observables are construed as random variables over a common classical probabilistic space entails that the PJPD are well defined. For these models, whatever the set of other assumptions they may include, whether it be locality, realism or anything else, the PJPD being well defined alone can be blamed for their violating the BI.
This alone, however, does not imply that Fine's theorem undermines the interpretation of Bell-type results in terms of local realism. For it is not the case that all hidden variable probabilistic models construe observables as random variables over a common classical probabilistic space. In particular, Fine never considers contextual h.v. research programs.
Hidden variable models outside the scope of Fine's argument
In arguing that his theorem shows that the traditional derivations of the BI In particular, the violation of the BI by experiment would not mean that h.v. theories have to be non-local in order to be compatible with all quantum phenomena.
Fine's argument presented above fails to help to achieve any of these aims. This is because the classical construal of the observables as random variables over a common probability space, which Fine shows to include the assumption of well defined joint probabilities, is non-contextual. Environmental contextuality is when the value of a quantity depends not on other quantities measured but on other features of the measurement context.
The idea of contextuality is more familiar than it seems. Let us take a rather simple analogy. Consider a horse race. Whether Quick Silver, your favorite horse, is going to win the race or not may depend on various factors. One factor could be the degree of humidity of the ground: for example, Quick Silver, even though an excellent runner on a dry ground, might be uncomfortable on a muddy soil. Whether Quicksilver is going to win presumably depends on which other horses are running the race as well. If so, the outcome of the raceexperiment depends on both the environmental context (the state of the track) and on the algebraic context of the race (What other horses are "measured").
It is both environmental and algebraic contextual. Within Bohm's theory, the result of a given measurement is encoded in the position of the "pointer", for which there is always a well defined probability It is worth noting that Fine has been advocating the framework of statistical variables as the appropriate framework for quantum probabilities since (at least) 1968, precisely because it allows for the PJPD not to be necessarily well defined. 27 Fine claims that statistical variable models admits a "natural" interpretation he dubs "Minimal Realism", according to which the following objects and properties are real:
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(1) physical objects -corresponding to the theoretical systems; Thus, the theoretical state of a quantum system is associated with an objective physical object (say, a quantum coin), an objective property (say, Quantum Quantum Tail), and the objective probability measure over this spectrum of forms (an even distribution for instance between Q-Heads and Q-Tails if our quantum coin is fair).
In minimal realism, probability distributions are non-reducible, objective fea- 29 See Clifton and Pagonis on this in [14] . In the following, we present the construction of Prism Models, thus granting (1), but then refute (2), thus showing that (3) does not follow.
Prism Models
Prism Models are probabilistic models characterized by the feature that observables do not in general have well defined probability distributions on all complete states λ ∈ Λ. More precisely, there are some quantum states, for which there are some hidden variables, for which there are some observables, on the ranges of which no probability distribution is defined. From a mathematical point of view, the idea is just that, while the observables Q i are separately construed as random variables, they are defined on different subsets σ(Q i ) of Λ, thus being associated with partial real-valued functions on Λ.
Note that this is different from saying that some observables have a zero probability associated with some range of outcome for a given state. or that, in other words, a given state has probability zero to display such or such outcome associated with certain observables or experimental configurations. Instead, in the framework of partial random variables, no probability distribution is defined for these states which fall outside the domain of the function of the observable considered. Now, another observable Q j will not in general have its function [Q j ] defined on the λ ∈ σ(Q i ). In other words, σ(Q i ) in general includes states in and outside the domain of the function [Q j ] associated with the measurement of Q j . If we happen to measure Q i and Q j at the same time, the set of hidden states for the joint systems on which the joint measurement is defined is the intersection σ(Q i ) ∩ σ(Q j ). So, whether you measure Q i and Q j together or separately makes a difference as to which set of complete states is selected. In some cases, the intersection may be empty for some observables, so that some joint distributions may not be defined. Typically, in the case of a Bell-type experiment, the joint distribution over all observables is not defined, because the intersection of all domains of all the functions associated with all the observables is empty.
More needs to be said about the interpretation of Prism Models. That the observables are associated with partial real-valued functions on Λ is interpreted in terms of defectiveness. For a given state |ψ , the λ encodes for determinate values of the outcomes, but it also encodes for some physical, predetermined property (or properties), defectiveness, that makes the system under consideration suitable for certain measurements, and not for others. An Q i -defective system just cannot respond to the experimental configuration (an analyzerdetector assembly) corresponding of the observable Q i and hence will not "show up" in the sense that it will not be counted by the detector. Applied to a Bell-type experiment, given the experimental configuration or observable 
Prism Models, the experiments, and quantum mechanics
Fine suggests that it is because the joint distributions are not defined that Prism Models can violate the Bell Inequalities in the right way. He claims 32 in [46] .
that Prism Models keep the structural features of the probabilistic model which codify the "local realistic" character of the observables, while avoiding the assumption of the existence of the joint probabilities, which he deems responsible for the Bell inequalities to obtain. 33 We argue in this subsection that this is not the case. The reason why Prism Models are successful is our actual failure of detection of all quantum systems. We will further argue that Fine's way to avoid that the PJPD makes Prism Models stand in contradiction with quantum theory. While providing an alternative model for the actual statistical results, Prism Models do not provide an alternative model for quantum probabilities. deficiency of the detectors used. We further assume that such deficiency is random, and hence, that the sample of systems we actually detect is a fair one. This is called the "enhancement hypothesis". 35 Fine proposes an alternative interpretation for failure of detection in the actual experiments. Within Prism Models, instead of being due to the random deficiency of our detectors, failure of detection reflects a physical property of the systems, i.e. defectiveness. Within the formalism of Prism Models, the property of defectiveness corresponds to the observables' being construed as partial random variable.
While giving room for a local deterministic account of the actual experimental results, the construal of the observables as partial functions on Λ makes Prism Models stand in contradiction to quantum mechanics (as normally construed).
If interpreted in terms of defectiveness, Prism Models predict that not all particles will be detected by a given experimental context. If not interpreted in terms of defectiveness, they still fail to make predictions (even probabilistic ones) for some runs of the experiments. In any case, Prism Models predict that they are some quantum systems (Q i -defective systems) and some experimental context (Q i ), for which no probability distribution over possible outcome-event is defined.
On the contrary, quantum mechanics predicts that any quantum system should respond to any given experimental question. Indeed, according to the usual quantum measurement theory, any quantum system can be appropriately coupled to some other system which will act as a perfect measuring apparatus.
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This motivates the usual interpretation according to which any deficiency in 35 On this, again, see [35] and reference therein. 36 We do not consider the limitations shown by Araki and Yanase in [1] . They can be disregarded for present purposes.
the experiment is in one of our detectors -it is a technical problem -and does not reflect any property of the system being measured.
Because Prism Models contradict quantum mechanics, their existence does not support the strong claim held by Fine, that there are models consistent with all quantum statistical predictions in which local realism is secured. It also does not support the claim that locality and realism are not at stake in the violation of the BI.
That said, what it does support is the claim that there are local deterministic models consistent with the actual statistics of Bell-type phenomena. Now, that
Prism Models are local deterministic models of the experiments to date, is, we believe, worth considering for further investigation. It would be certainly worth pursuing a research program to experimentally assess whether or not there is a detection efficiency limit. Szabó investigates to what extent Prism Models can be refuted by experiment on the basis of the detection efficiency rates. His conclusion is that actual experimental results still do not constitute a serious objection to Prism Models. Fine's models might be more relevant than they seem.
POSSIBLE CUT: DISCUSSION OF DEFFECTIVENESS
If further experimental investigation was favorable to Prism Models, some further interpretational work would still have to be done. The interpretation in terms of defectiveness seems unsatisfactory as it stands. What we have is that there are some complete states which possess some physical property such that some observables cannot be measured. Fine does not give any further interpretation of this property. At least three further interpretations are possible.
First, if an observable corresponds to some determinate property-assignment, one interpretation is that the property corresponding to the observable is not measurable. Unless Fine could provide an explanation for why this happens, such an interpretation goes against one of the most fundamental assumptions in the methodology of experiment about the possibility of measurement. Moreover, it might run into problems with Kochen-Specker-type theorems. Another interpretation would be that the observable corresponds to a generic property, but the value of this property is unmeasurable because it is indefinite. The idea is that some properties do not have any determinate value, that could be correlated either deterministically or stochastically with the measurement context. This could correspond to the notions of "spread quantities" or "inexact values" that have been defended by some authors. 37 However, Fine seems to reject this option himself: he accepts the objections leveled against such notion of spread quantities. 38 Yet another interpretation is that the observable corresponds to a generic property, but there are some states that simply do not "have" this generic property, in any form, exact or spread. This obviously needs more fleshing out, but it might be what Fine has in mind, considering the concluding remark of [22] :
After all, if we hold that probabilities (including joint probabilities) are real properties, then some observable may simply not have them.
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That said, Fine never seriously investigates such issues. Indeed, Fine himself admits that Prism Models are somewhat too "cheap" and too "easy". Fine's argument can be reconstructed as coming in two steps:
(1) In accepting QM, the local realist is committed to rejecting the existence of joint probabilities for incompatible observables;
(2) By the converse of the new derivation, anyone committing to a h.v. model from which the BI are derivable is also committed to the existence of joint probabilities for incompatible observables.
Svetlichny, Redhead, Brown and Butterfield have investigated this argument.
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They accept (1) but show that (2) is not well supported. In the following, we 41 in [45] .
shall briefly sum up their argument against (2) and then modestly contribute to undermining Fine's argument in raising some objections against (1).
Svetlichny et alii reject (2) on the basis that Fine's theorem does not show that the BI's holding implies the joint probabilities for incompatible to exist in the sense of being physically real. What has been shown instead is a weaker result,
i.e. that the BI's holding implies the formal definition of the joint probabilities.
But the local realist might be happy to accept the joint probabilities as being defined formally, but without giving them any physical significance.
Fine himself gives a criteria, (jd),) for the joint probabilities to be considered as physically real. 42 .
(jd) -Observables A 1 , ..., A n of a quantum system obey (jd) just in case, for every n-place Borel function f , there is an observable of the system with operator f (A 1 , ..., A n ), and for all states Ψ of the system there is a probability measure µ Ψ,A 1 ,...,An on the Borel sets of R n that returns the quantum single distributions P
as marginals and is such that for all borel sets S:
Note that (jd) is not what Fine shows to be equivalent to the BI's holding in his main theorem. In the theorem the definition of the PJPD depends on the state and on the four observables considered in the experiment. So, if (jd)
is the appropriate formalization of the idea that the joint probabilities exist, 42 The following is taken from [22] . Fine presents (jd) as a criteria for the joint probabilities to exist in [20, p. 31 ].
Fine's theorem cannot be used to legitimate (2) . Further investigation about the relationships between (jd) and the BI's holding is needed.
Fine manages to show that violations of the BI are also violations of (jd), but not the converse, which is needed for (2) formalization of the idea that the joint probabilities exist, then it is not the case that a commitment to the non-existence of the joint probabilities (due to a commitment to QM) implies commitment to the BI to be violated, and (2) is undermined.
One could object that (jd) is too strong, and that weakest assumptions (such as the ones appearing in Fine's main theorem) express the idea of the physical existence of the PJPD. Svetlichny et alii's study allows to counter such an objection. Indeed, they show that, if we look at the probabilities through the limiting relative frequencies generated on random sequences in the real world, there are some models of the Bell-type experiment which satisfy the BI while violating (jd). (1) to believe that the theory is true or approximately so, or, (2) to take the theory as empirically adequate.
One might want to take an empiricist stance towards quantum theory, but still investigate the interpretation of the violation of the BI by the experimental outcomes. Here, van Fraassen is a case in point. His interpretation of Bell-type experiments is that Bell-type experiments exhibit some phenomena which do not fit into one of our favorite models for scientific explanations: the common cause model. This interpretation is epistemological rather than ontological: it constraints the kinds of models that are legitimate, not the way the world is. 47 We do not see how one could argue that an anti-realist like van Fraassen is committed, in investigating the violation of the BI, to the existence of the 47 At least this is what van Fraassen claims in [52] . The discussion about whether or not van Fraassen can stay at the level of models without drawing metaphysical conclusion is beyond the scope of this paper.
joint probabilities in any ontologically robust sense.
From a more general point of view, we would like to stress that to accept a probabilistic physical theory does not involve any commitment to any particular interpretation of probabilities. 48 Scientific realists as well as scientific empiricists can choose to interpret the probabilities involved in the theory as being:
(a) either objective or subjective;
(b) either reducible or irreducible to physical properties.
That some probabilities can be defined formally does not imply that they "exist" in any ontologically strong sense.
We maintain that the converse of this last statement holds as well: that some probabilities cannot be defined formally does not imply that they do not "exist", which brings us to the third component of (1), i.e. that to be realist about a theory that contains probabilities is sufficient for being committed to the "existence" of and only of the probabilities that are well defined within the theory. The point is easy to make in the case where one takes an empirical stance toward quantum mechanics. In this case, that some probabilities are not formally defined in the theory does not imply that they do not "exist", since a theory that pretends only to be empirically adequate does not preclude the "existence" of probabilities not contained in the formalism itself. But even for the realist, that some objects are not defined in a given formalism does not imply that these objects do not exist at the ontological level. For example, a defendant of a realist stance toward the Many-Worlds interpretation may believe that worlds exist as supervenient patterns emerging within the wave function, while explicitly avoiding to formally define them within the formalism. 49 One important aim of the interpretational work on physical theories is precisely to 1. distinguish clearly, within the formalism, what is physically significant from what is an artifact of the mathematical construction, and 2. complement the ontology with these entities which gives us a consistent view of a world in which the theory can be true.
The upshot is that, unless one accepts additional assumptions about realism and the interpretation of probabilities, the first step of Fine's last argument for his strong interpretation of his result does not stand better than the second. At the end, Fine's last line of argument seems to fail, unless further assumptions are made.
Conclusion
We have argued that:
• Fine's argument that the definition of joint probabilities is a hidden assumption in the traditional derivations of the BI holds only for a restricted class of h.v. theories, which were ruled out by previous theorems; 49 This, in order to avoid the preferred basis problem. For more details on this, see [53] , [54] . That said, the framework of statistical variables, which Fine has been advocating as the appropriate one for quantum probabilities, is interesting, especially when fleshed out with a Bohmian interpretation. Further, Fine's Prism Models constitute a competitive model for the outcomes distributions to date, and should probably be given more attention.
